The ‘means’ of infringement: tracing a line through Moorhouse, Tape Manufacturers, Cooper, and Kazaa (via Sony)

2010.02.05

The ‘means’ of infringement: tracing a line through Moorhouse, Tape Manufacturers, Cooper, and Kazaa (via Sony)

The iiNet judgment traces an interesting line through authorisation liability in the context of technology cases. Cowdroy reads the technology authorisation cases (Moorhouse, Australian Tape Manufacturers, Cooper, and Kazaa) as predicating liability firstly upon whether the defendant has provided the ‘means’ of infringement; a complex factual determination that depends on the context, but seems to implicitly incorporate the Sony test of whether the technology has substantial non-infringing uses and an intention test that goes to the design of the system and the invitation to infringe.

The conclusion that Cowdrow J draws is that iiNet does not provide the ‘means’ to infringement, because (a) the internet has many ‘lawful uses’ (Tape Manufacturers) (cf Sony, ‘substantial non-infringing uses’); and (b) iiNet has not actively supported the system that is the ‘means’ of infringement (the BitTorrent system, as a whole). Crucially, one does not infringe merely by using the internet – users need to do something else (seek out BitTorrent trackers and files) in order to infringe. If iiNet had played a more active part in the infringement, then it may be seen as providing the ‘means’ (in Moorhouse, this was by providing a copier in a library and effectively extending an invitation to infringe (per Jacobs J) or where it was ‘likely’ to be used for infringement (per Gibbs J); in Kazaa this was the advertising, predominantly ‘join the revolution’; in Cooper it was the knowledge and intent that most files on the website were infringing). What makes this interesting is that ‘means’ appears to incorporate intent in some way, although it is not exactly clear how this plays out.

Only after the ‘means’ are identified do the other factors become relevant – control, power to prevent, and knowledge of infringements. It would seem that the best reading of Cooper is that the ISP in that case was that while it did not provide the ‘means’ by hosting Cooper’s website, it was drawn into his infringement by the support it gave him with knowledge and intent that the files were predominantly infringing. No such relationship of control or support existed between iiNet and anyone providing BitTorrent services.

Much of this reasoning appears to depend on a finding that the internet is much more useful for non-infringing uses (not a ‘human right’, but performs a “central role in almost all aspects of modern life”).([411]) This distinguishes general technologies that “have lawful uses” (Tape Manufacturers) from technologies like Kazaa and Cooper’s website, whose ‘predominant’ or ‘overwhelming’ uses are to infringe ([412]). This seems explicitly draw Australian authority into line with the development of US authority in Sony, that developers will not be liable for products that have “substantial non-infringing uses”, and the exception that was drawn in Grokster holding developers liable where they ‘induced’ infringement. In this way, Cowdroy neatly reads Moorhouse in line with Sony and both Cooper and Kazaa in line with Grokster.

This is actually quite a neat distinction. Rather than treating every link in the chain that makes infringement possible as the ‘means’ of infringement and then having to carefully examine factors such as control, power to prevent, and knowledge, Cowdroy J has managed to articulate a distinction between mere facilities and services that are actually either designed to aide infringement, promoted to do so, or have little other purpose than to facilitate infringement. This puts an end to the classic confusion – if iiNet are liable for the acts of its users, surely the electricity company can also be liable, because but for their power, infringements could not occur. By interpreting ‘means of infringement’to require some more active role, Cowdroy J has created some certainty for the providers of general use technologies.

The role of s 101(1A)

A potential problem on appeal may be whether this definition of ‘means’ is consistent with s 101(1A), which requires that in addressing authorisation, a court must take into account control (power to prevent), relationship, and reasonable steps taken. If the enquiry is ended by the definition of ‘means’ of infringement, these factors may not be adequately taken into account. Justice Cowdroy dealt with this by relying on Kazaa and Metro as authority that 101(1A) did not change the common law for authorisation([415]); the statutory considerations are therefore relevant, and must be considered, but they seem to be subsumed within the threshold question of whether the respondent provided the ‘means’. So, in this case, iiNet did not have a power to prevent because they had no control BitTorrent – which meant that iiNet did not provide the ‘means’.([424],[444]) Similarly, there was nothing in the relationship of iiNet with its subscribers that suggested that iiNet authorised their infringements – unlike Kazaa.([452]) Finally, the Court found that iiNet had no reasonable steps it could have taken to prevent infringement.([458]) It would seem, in Cowdroy J’s framework, that if any of these factors were different, iiNet may be taken as having provided the ‘means’ for infringement (though they are not determinative of themselves). The same goes for knowledge and encouragement, which are relevant but not statutory factors.([463], [473]). More analysis is required as to how exactly the statutory factors inform both the finding of whether a technology provides the ‘means’ of infringement and the questions that must be asked after the means have been identified, but, as a complex question of fact, Cowdroy J’s use of a distinction based upon the ‘means’ does not seem to fall into an error of law and seems to provide a useful way to distinguish active from passive actors.

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IIA Australian ISPs will not forward copyright enforcement letters

2008.08.04


There is always a danger when intermediaries are pressured to act in the interests of copyright owners. There is little oversight, large risks to privacy, and little incentive to refuse in the interests of subscribers. Pressure on intermediaries really alters the copyright balance, making it much easier for copyright owners to attack users, shrinking grey zones and chilling speech, and abrogating the presumption of innocence.

In this environment, it is always reassuring to hear that ISPs will not bow to the pressure that is brought to bear by the copyright industry. The Age is today reporting that BigPond have strongly opposed the pressure from AFACT.

Last week I had the opportunity to meet again with Peter Coroneos, CEO of the Internet Industry Association at a briefing hosted by QUT Law Faculty.

Peter raised some points of oppisition by Austrlaian ISPs against the 3 strikes policy which is being pushed by MIPI and AFACT.

It seems that a formal agreement has stalled. I am still, however, highly concerned by informal agreements where ISPs voluntarily agree to play the role of copyright enforcers on behalf of the copyright industry. In the US, we are now seeing the copyright industry issuing what they call “settlement letters” to ISPs (mainly universities), purporting to identify users who are involved in copyright infringement. In fact, the letters have been shown to be highly inaccurate. The letters threaten the individual identified by the university with the initation of a copyright lawsuit if the user does not settle immediately, through an easy to use settlement gateway (which accepts credit card settlements of between $3000 and $11000 with a minimum of hassle). The process generates significant revenue for the copyright industry, and practically eliminates the cost of bringing lawsuits and proving both infringement and damages. Faced with the prospect of an up-front settlement or an expensive trial process, rational users may often chose to settle, even if they are not legally liable.

I asked Peter Coroneos if, when Australian ISPs are handed a letter purporting to identify a user by ip address who is alleged to have downloaded infringing material, whether they will identify the subscriber or pass on the threat? This process poses significant privacy risks to Australian individuals, and substantially alters the copyright balance. By facilitating this method, the law effectively eliminates any presumption of innocence or requirement for copyright owners to prove their case. I wrote a paper several years ago on the risks to individuals if intermediaries are co-opted into acting on the behalf of copyright owners without proper judicial oversight – simply put, intermediaries have little incentive to look out for the legitimate interests of individual subscribers, and individual subscribers have little standing to object on their own behalf. That paper considered formal pre-trial discovery and anton pillar orders – with recent evidence suggesting that even judicial oversight is somewhat limited in these cases: see Privacy v IP Litigation: preliminary third party discovery on the Internet.

Peter answered that this is an issue which will require a test case to determine. The argument made by copyright owners is that Section 36 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), which provides for secondary liability for authorisation of copyright infringement (for Part III works), is not covered by the safe harbours introduced in 2004. Accordingly, if ISPs are provided with actual knowledge of alleged infringements, and do not act on their Acceptable Use Policies to terminate the users' subscriptions, they will be liable for authorisation of copyright infringement.

The ISPs, on the other hand, argue that their behaviour is caught by the first limb of the safe harbour, Category A activty. This seems to be a straightforward reading of the legislation. The ISPs also note that the obligation to terminate repeat infringers under s 116AH(1) requires proof of infringement, not mere allegations of infringement. The ISPs, therefore, should fit squarely within the safe harbour, even if the copyright interests forward multiple letters alleging infringement.

Peter concluded that the position is too uncertain in Australian copyright law, and will probably require a test case to determine. I asked whether, until the law is clarified, Australian ISPs would refuse to volunteer identifying details of their subscribers purportedly identified by IP address, short of an Anton Pillar Order or subpoena (with the concommitant judicial oversight). Peter reassured me that he believes that Australian ISPs would oppose such attempts by copyright owners… I certainly hope that he's correct.

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